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Due Process Limits on State Estate
Taxation: An Analogy to the State
Corporate Income Tax
The litigation between California and Texas as to which state should
be able to levy an estate tax on Howard Hughes' intangible property'
brings to the forefront once again an old multiple taxation problem arising
out of the United States federal structure. The U.S. Supreme Court has
limited multiple taxation of estates by recognizing that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' requires that real estate3 or tangible
1. The intangible property at stake was Summa Corporation stock owned by Howard Hughes at
the time of his death. Though initially rumored to be worth more than a billion dollars, the stock was
eventually valued at nearly three hundred and seventy million dollars. Litigation began in 1978, when
the U.S. Supreme Court denied California's motion for leave to file a complaint under the Court's
original jurisdiction. California v. Texas 1, 437 U.S. 601 (1978). Although the denial was handed
down without explanation in a per curiam decision, four concurring Justices suggested that jurisdic-
tion had been denied on the grounds that there was no justiciable case or controversy. Id. at 601-02
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 614-15 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring).
These Justices further suggested that a remedy might be found by filing an interpleader action in a
federal district court. Id. at 601 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 608-09 n.10 (Stewart, J., joined by
Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring); id. at 615-16 (Powell, J., concurring). A Texas district court
dismissed a subsequent interpleader action because of lack of diversity. Lummis v. White, 491 F.
Supp. 5 (W.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd, 629 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the lower court
case history, see infra text accompanying notes 39-49 and note 49. In 1982, the Supreme Court
reversed again, holding that the Eleventh Amendment does bar a statutory interpleader action in a
federal district court. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982) (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
Blackmun, Rehnquist, & O'Connor, JJ.). Justice Brennan concurred, but only on the grounds that as
long as no constitutional violation could be alleged, a remedy would have to be allowed under the
Court's original jurisdiction. Brennan also suggested that he agreed with Justice Powell's arguments
that a due process violation could be alleged. Id. at 92. Justice Powell wrote a strong dissenting
opinion in which Justices Marshall and Stevens joined, arguing that since the suit under the Court's
original jurisdiction was not ripe, a remedy should not be sought there, but rather the Court should
recognize that due process does prohibit double taxation of decedent's estates, and that at any rate a
remedy to a problem caused by the federal structure of the United States should be available. Id. at
94, 98-101. Since no other remedy was available, the Court deemed the dispute between the states
justiciable as an action in the nature of an interpleader, and simultaneously granted California's re-
newed motion for leave to file a complaint against Texas under the Court's original jurisdiction.
California v. Texas II, 457 U.S. 164 (1982) (per curiam). Justice Powell issued a dissent declaring
that the suit was unripe. Id. at 169-71 (Powell, J., joined by Marshall, Rehnquist, & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting). Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court appointed a Special Master, who subsequently
arranged a settlement of the case. According to one newspaper account, both states have agreed to split
the estate tax. No finding of domicile was made. Rather, the Hughes estate will pay 50 million dollars
in cash to Texas. California will receive 44 million dollars in cash, along with 70 acres of prime real
estate adjacent to the Hughes airstrip west of Los Angeles. California waived its right to claim domi-
cile. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1984, at A6, col. 1.
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. The notion that real property may be taxed only by the state within which the property is
located-the state of situs-is rooted in ancient common law. For representative Supreme Court cases
that discuss and elevate the notion to a principle of constitutional law, see Union Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1905) ("The power of taxation . . . is exercised upon the
assumption of an equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in the protection of his person and property
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personal property4 be subject to an estate tax only in the state where the
property is physically located at the time of death-the state of situs.5
Since real estate and tangible property are physically present in only one
place at a time, estates comprised of these types of assets are not
threatened by multiple taxation.6
Intangible property, such as stocks and bonds, however, is by nature
siteless.' Therefore, another means to trigger state sovereign taxing pow-
ers must be used. The states have chosen to use the state of the decedent's
domicile,' rather than the state of situs, to levy an estate tax on intangible
property. Although all states but one agree that a person may have only
. . . . If the taxing power be in no position to render these services . . [because] such property be
wholly within the taxing power of another State . . . to which it looks for protection . . . [the taxa-
tion by the domiciliary state amounts.tol a taking of property without due process of law."); State Tax
on Foreign-held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300, 319 (1872) (taxing power of state limited to persons,
property and businesses within its jurisdiction); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
429 (1819) ("All subjects over which the sovereign power of a State extends, are objects of taxation;
but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation.");
see also Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422, 429 (1935) (real estate taxable only by the state in which the
real estate is located).
4. Tangible personal property, like real property, is taxable only by the state of situs. See Union
Refrigerator, 199 U.S. at 204 (extending same protection from multiple taxation accorded real prop-
erty to tangible personal property); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 488-92 (1925) (extending
Union Refrigerator rationale governing taxation of property to taxation of estates; even though estate
tax is levied on succession of property, rather than on property itself, state must still have jurisdiction
over property to levy estate tax); see also Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 364 (1939) ("The power
of government and its agencies to possess and to exclude others from possessing tangibles, and thus to
exclude them from enjoying rights in tangibles located within its territory, affords adequate basis for
an exclusive taxing jurisdiction."); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112, 118
(1934) (taxability of tangible personalty determined by situs, regardless of decedent's domicile). But
see Bittker, The Taxation of Out-of-State Tangible Property, 56 YALE L.J. 640 (1947) discussed
infra note 61 (suggesting that tangibles should not be treated the same as real property).
5. For two interesting analyses arguing that the sole function of the concept of situs is to prevent
double taxation, see Brown, Multiple Taxation by the States-What Is Left of It?, 48 HARV. L. REV.
407, 408-09 (1935); Lowndes, Spurious Conceptions of the Constitutional Law of Taxation, 47
HARV. L. REV. 628, 630-39 (1934).
6. If there is a dispute as to the situs of the property, the claiming states or the threatened estate
may request Supreme Court review of the conflicting state court judgments. See Thomas v. Virginia,
364 U.S. 443 (1960) (per curiam) (due process prohibits state inheritance tax on tangible property
outside that state); Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949) (same).
7. Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 493 (1947) (distinguishing tangible property from
intangible property and declaring that there is no method of determining where intangibles are situ-
ated); State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 178 (1942) (same); Union Refrigerator, 199 U.S.
at 205 (same).
8. Domicile is defined as:
That place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment,
and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning . . . . A person may
have more than one residence but only one domicile. The legal domicile of a person is impor-
tant since it, rather than the actual residence, often controls the jurisdiction of the taxing au-
thorities . ...
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (5th ed. 1979). Once a person acquires a domicile, he or she retains
that domicile until he or she acquires a new one. There are three types of domicile: (1) the domicile of
origin, which is the place where one is born; (2) the domicile of choice, which a person of requisite
legal capacity acquires by physical presence and the intent to remain indefinitely; (3) the domicile
fixed by the operation of law usually concerning the domicile of children and incompetents. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 11-23 (1971). The actual legal definition of domicile
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one domicile at a time,9 occasionally, as in the Howard Hughes case, more
than one state claims that the deceased was domiciled within its borders.10
Unlike situs, however, use of the state common law concept of domicile for
the purpose of determining jurisdiction to levy an estate tax is considered
unreviewable in either the lower federal courts or the United States Su-
preme Court.11 There are no established constitutional" bars to protect
the intangible estate from multiple taxation. The estate must pay each
state its claimed tax. 3
Justice Powell recently argued that the multiple taxation of an estate by
more than one state on the basis of domicile violates the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 This Note suggests that, although Justice
Powell's specific suggestion as to how the due process analysis could be
used to provide a remedy is not feasible, the due process limits on state
power in the corporate taxation area offer a persuasive analogy for the
recognition of due process limits on state power to tax intangible estates.15
Once these principles are recognized, estate administrators would be able
to seek a remedy in the Supreme Court to review the judgments rendered
by state courts. The application of these due process limits on state power
varies from one state to the next. See infra text accompanying notes 30-31. Two articles which dis-
cuss some of the mechanics of how domicile is determined and the various technical problems from a
practitioner's point of view are Guterman, Avoidance of Double Death Taxation of Estates and
Trusts, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 701, 703-08 (1947); Marsh, Multiple Death Taxation in the United
States, 8 UCLA L. Rxv. 69, 79-87 (1961).
9. Only North Carolina does not grant any sort of exemption to ensure that only the one state of
domicile levies an estate tax, see discussion infra note 25.
10. One example of the complicated litigation which ensues when two states attempt to tax the
same intangible estate is set forth in the In re Dorrance's Estate litigation: In re Dorrance's Estate,
309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 660 (1932) (federal question not properly presented
to, or passed upon by Pennsylvania Supreme Court); In re Dorrance's Estate, 172 A. 900 (Pa. 1932)
(decision reaffirmed), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 617 (1932); New Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 580
(1932) (motion for leave to file complaint under Court's original jurisdiction denied); Pennsylvania v.
New Jersey, 288 U.S. 618 (1933) (same); Dorrance v. Martin, 12 F. Supp. 746 (D.N.J.) (attempt to
enjoin collection of New Jersey's assessment dismissed on grounds that federal jurisdiction was lack-
ing), aff'd sub nom. Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935); In re Dorrance's Estate, 113 N.J. Eq. 266,
166 A. 177 (Prerog. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601 (Prerog. Ct.), supplemented by,
116 N.J. Eq. 204, 172 A. 503 (Prerog. Ct. 1934), aff'd sub nom. Dorrance v. Thayer-Martin, 13
N.J. Misc. 168, 176 A. 902 (1935), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184 A. 743, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678
(1936) (ultimately both states permitted to levy estate tax on Campbell Soup fortune left by Mr.
Dorrance).
11. See Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937).
12. There was a constitutiorial prohibition against such multiple taxation of intangible estates,
Farmers Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930), but it has been overruled by State Tax
Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942). See infra note 18.
13. See Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939); Worcester County Trust Co. v.
Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299 (1937).
14. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 92-101 (1982) (Powell, J., joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
15. The due process limits in the state corporate tax area comport with the recent developments in
due process analysis in other areas, such as choice of law and adjudicative jurisdiction. See infra text
accompanying notes 61-66 & note 65.
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to tax intangibles would add a coherence sorely lacking in the due process
analysis currently used in state estate taxation.
I. THE FAILURE OF AN ANALOGY:
DUE PROCESS LIMITS BREAK DOWN
The series of cases prior to 1942 which established due process limits
on estate taxation of real estate, tangibles, and intangibles were based on a
somewhat mechanical extension of the ancient doctrine of situs.16 In 1942
the Supreme Court found that the logic behind the doctrine of situs, so far
removed from its original field of application, could not justify similar due
process limits on intangible property.17 Ending twelve years of confusion
and indecision," the Court declared in State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich
that because the estate tax is a tax on the transfer of property from the
dead to the living, any state which facilitates that transfer has a taxable
16. See supra notes 3, 4, 5 & 7 which trace the evolution of due process limits on real and
tangible property alongside the distinctions the Court has drawn regarding intangibles.
17. State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
18. Prior to 1929, there was no prohibition on the multiple taxation of intangibles, Blackstone v.
Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903). Succession was a privilege granted, and therefore taxable, by the state of
domicile and any other state whose laws facilitated the succession. Id. at 204-05. However, as intangi-
ble property became more important, and tangible property was granted the same immunity from
multiple taxation as real property, Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 488-92 (1925), the Court felt
compelled to overrule Blackstone and grant intangible property a similar immunity from multiple
taxation despite the lack of an ascertainable situs. In Farmers Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204
(1930), the Court held that state bonds and municipal certificates of indebtedness were taxable only
by the state of domicile, declaring that:
We have determined that in general intangibles may be properly taxed at the domicile of their
owner and we can find no sufficient reason for saying that they are not entitled to enjoy an
immunity against taxation at more than one place similar to that accorded to tangibles. The
difference between the two things, although obvious enough, seems insufficient to justify the
harsh and oppressive discrimination against intangibles ....
Id. at 212. A rapid succession of cases followed, extending immunity from multiple taxation to other
forms of intangible property: Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930) (bank deposits, promissory
notes and bonds); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1 (1930) (indebtedness for ad-
vances and unpaid dividends); First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932) (corporate stock).
Within a few years, however, the Court began its retreat from the Farmers Loan position. Graves
v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939) (permitting taxation of trust property by both state of domicile and
state of administration); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939) (same). In 1942, the Court re-
turned to its original rule, permitting states to levy taxes on the basis of different benefits conferred,
stating:
[E]ven though we believed that a different system should be designed to protect against multi-
ple taxation, it is not our province to provide it . . . . To do so would be to indulge in the
dangerous assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment was "intended to give us carte blanche
to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions."
State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 181 (1942) (citations omitted). For a more thorough
history and discussion of these doctrinal shifts caused by the Supreme Court's attempts to eliminate
multiple taxation of intangibles, see Brown, The Present Status of Multiple Taxation of Intangible
Property, 40 MICH. L. REv. 806 (1942); Guterman, Revitalization of Multiple State Death Taxa-
tion, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1249 (1942); Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word, 44 YALE L.J.
582 (1935); Morton & Cotton, Limitations on State Jurisdiction to Levy Death Taxes, 5 MIAMi L.Q.
449 (1951); Nash, And Again Multiple Taxation?, 26 GEO. L.J. 288 (1938).
19. 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
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relationship to succession.2" Thus if the intangible estate consists of corpo-
rate stock, the decedent's state of domicile,21 the state in which the stock
certificates are kept in a bank safety vault,22 the state of corporate domi-
cile,2" and any other state conferring some benefit, 4 may levy an estate
tax, since each has facilitated the transfer of the corporate stock. The
states, however, have not chosen to do so: Of the forty-nine states that levy
an estate tax, forty-eight have effectively declared that only the state of
domicile may levy an estate tax.25 The state legislatures have essentially
20. The Aldrich Court declared:
[W]e repeat that there is no constitutional rule of immunity from taxation of intangibles by
more than one State. In case of shares of stock, "jurisdiction to tax" is not restricted to the
domiciliary State. Another State which has extended benefits or protection, or which can
demonstrate "the practical fact of its power" or sovereignty as respects the shares . . . may
likewise constitutionally make its exaction. In other words, we restore these intangibles to the
constitutional status which they occupied up to a few years ago.
State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 181-82 (1942) (citations omitted).
21. Id.
22. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 360-61, 370 (1939).
23. See State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. at 178.
24. In his dissent to State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, Justice Jackson protested the looseness of such
a benefits-conferred rationale:
My difficulty is that on its face-and as so far applied-this test comes out to the point where
might does make right. For in a very real sense every State and Territory in the Union has
conferred very real benefits upon every inhabitant of the Union. Some States have seen to it
that our food is properly produced . . . . All of them have yielded up men to provide govern-
ment at home and to repel the enemy abroad. I am the very real debtor, but am frank enough
to say I hope not a potential taxpayer, of all.
Id. at 200.
25. Eighteen states provide complete immunity from estate taxes for intangibles owned by a non-
resident decedent. INHER. EST. & GIFT TAx REP. (CCH) % 12,080 (Nov. 1970); Note, Problematic
Definitions of Property in Multistate Death Taxation, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1656, 1664 (1977) [herein-
after referred to as Note, Problematic Definitions]. Seventeen other states have adopted the provisions
of the UNIF. RECIPROCAL TRANSFER TAX ACT, 7A U.L.A. 317 (Supp. 1928) exempting intangibles
owned by a nonresident if his or her domicile either does not tax the intangibles of nonresidents, or
providing an exemption whenever the decedent's domicile provides a reciprocal exemption. Note,
Problematic Definitions, supra, at 1664. An additional 13 states grant partial exemptions to foreign-
held intangibles. Id. at 1664-65. Only North Carolina does not grant an exemption for a nonresi-
dent's intangibles. Id. at 1665 n.58. Nevada does not even levy an estate tax. NEv. CONST. art. 10,
§ 1. For another discussion of the exemptions and the citations of the relevant statutes, see Survey of
State Death Tax Systems and of Selected Problems of Double Taxation of Real Property Interests, 14
REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE, AND TRUST J. 277, 287 apps. A & B (1979) (listing relevant state
statutes) [hereinafter referred to as Survey].
State legislatures have also attempted to solve the problem by adopting arbitration or compromise
acts. See UNIF. INTERSTATE COMPROMISE OF DEATH TAXES ACT, 8A U.L.A. 535 (1943) (empow-
ering tax officials of claiming states to negotiate state's share of taxes); UNIF. INTERSTATE ARBITRA-
TION OF DEATH TAxES ACT, 8A U.L.A. 521 (1943) (empowering arbitration board to make binding
determination of domicile). Many states have not adopted either of these schemes, however, and even
among those states which have, the schemes may not be mandatory. As a result, concerned parties
must look to judicial intervention. Note, Double Domicile and Federal Interpleader Revisited, 33 Sw.
L.J. 1241, 1244 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Note, Double Domicile]. For other discussions of
these various provisions, see Freedman, Practical Aspects of Multiple State Taxation of Intangibles of
NonResident Decedents Since the Aldrich Case, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 41, 41-59 (1948); Guter-
man, supra note 18, at 1279-80; INHER. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) V 12,035 (March 1975).
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eliminated the problem of multiple taxation caused by the differing bene-
fits which states may confer upon the succession of intangible estates.26
The problem of multiple findings of domicile, however, remains unad-
dressed and unsolved. As Justice Powell recently declared, it seems inher-
ently illogical to uphold multiple taxation on the basis of domicile when
each of the claiming states would agree that only the state of domicile may
levy an estate tax and that a person may have only one domicile at the
time of death.27 Since a person may have only one domicile at a time, one
of the states levying the estate tax necessarily lacks domicile. The state
that lacks domicile lacks the nexus required by the due process clause.2 8
The same state has also levied the tax without the authority of its own
state law. Such a violation of state law, in and of itself, constitutes a due
process violation. 9
The difficulty with this reasoning is that it presumes not only that the
disputing states agree that a person may have only one domicile at a time
and that only the state of domicile may levy a tax,"0 but also that each of
the states has defined domicile in precisely the same way in its case law
and has given the exact same evidentiary weight to the various factors and
26. When one state declares a decedent's property intangible and another declares the same prop-
erty tangible personalty, however, the difference in characterization can lead either to double taxation
or to no taxation at all. See Note, Problematic Definitions, supra note 25, at 1665-70; Survey, supra
note 25, at 277-86.
27. See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Although states are not bound by the laws of other states, states are bound by their own laws.
See infra text accompanying notes 27-39. If a state violates its own law, that constitutes a due process
violation, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which gives rise to federal question jurisdiction.
Although in this particular situation the Tax Injunction Act bars federal court jurisdiction, see infra
note 87, the federal question does give rise to Supreme Court review. If the state supreme court finds
that a decedent was domiciled within its borders when controlling precedent indicates that the court
should have found otherwise, the estate administrators are not without remedy. Even though state
supreme courts are normally the final authorities on matters of state law, the U. S. Supreme Court
will review state law matters to prevent the independent and adequate state ground doctrine from
either trumping Supreme Court jurisdiction or nullifying a constitutional right. See Aloha Airlines v.
Director of Taxation, 104 S. Ct. 291 (1983); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Ward v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920). Allowing a state to determine that a person was domiciled
within the state at the time of death, despite contrary state precedent, would trivialize the due process
limits on state taxing power. It is rather surprising that no one has attempted to make this type of
claim. The record in the Hughes cases suggests that the Hughes estate administrators could have
made a good case that, in declaring that Hughes was domiciled within its borders, Texas violated its
own law. See discussion infra notes 89-91.
30. Of course, if the claiming states do not agree that only the state of domicile may levy an estate
tax or that a person may have only one domicile at a time, then Justice Powell's argument fails
completely. One state could claim the tax on the basis of corporate domicile, and the other state would
claim the tax on the basis of the decedent's domicile. Each state could also claim the tax on the same
basis of domicile.
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presumptions considered to determine domicile. Yet a prominent charac-
teristic of common law is that case law rarely, if ever, develops in pre-
cisely the same way among different courts and different states. As a re-
sult, it is entirely possible for a court to find domicile pursuant to its own
state law, although that finding may not be consistent with another state's
law. States are not bound by the laws of other states except as dictated by
the full faith and credit clause."1 As the Howard Hughes case illustrates,
there is almost never a single, determinate forum for multiple taxation of
intangible estates when two or more states assert that the decedent was
domiciled within their respective borders at the time of death. Our federal
structure precludes a remedy. 2
II. FALLING THROUGH THE INTERSTICES OF THE FEDERAL
STRUCTURE
A. The Inadequacy of State Court Remedies
Because domicile is a state common law concept, the determination as
to where a decedent is domiciled must be made in a state court according
to state law. If the estate administrators bring suit in a Texas state court
alleging that the decedent was domiciled only in Texas, the Texas court
cannot render a judgment binding on the state of California. The sover-
eign immunity doctrine 3 protects California from being haled into a
31. See infra text accompanying notes 35-38.
32. Justice Powell explicitly acknowledged the uniquely federal cause of the multiple taxation
problem: "'It is our federal system which creates the possibility of double taxation. Somewhere within
that federal system we should be able to find remedies for the frictions which that system creates."'
California v. Texas I, 437 U.S. 601, 616 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Chafee, Federal
Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 388 (1940)). Justice Brennan also expressed
such a concern: "I agree with Professor Chafee. . . that '[s]omewhere within [the] federal system we
should be able to find remedies for the frictions which that system creates."' Cory v. White, 457 U.S.
85, 92 (1982). In his dissent from the latter opinion, Justice Powell again stressed his concern that
there be a federal solution to a federal problem: "Thus, at least in a case such as this, in which the
very controversy is the result of our federal system, I continue to believe that resort to federal inter-
pleader is not proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment as construed by Edelman v. Jordan." Id. at 96
(Powell, J., dissenting).
33. Sovereign immunity is an ancient common law concept rooted in English feudalism. Though
some historians have claimed that the concept is an accident of history, see 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 511-18 (2d ed. 1899), ensuring the sovereign immunity of
the states was clearly a major concern during the Constitutional Convention:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the
exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every
State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the
convention, it will remain with the States ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Sovereign immunity was
not an explicit part of the Constitution, however, until the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment,
which addresses sovereign immunity with respect to federal courts but not state courts. Nonetheless
the Court has often implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, recognized such immunity in other state
courts. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75, 80 (1961) (Pennsylvania
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Texas court as long as California has not somehow entered Texas terri-
tory, subjecting itself to Texas sovereignty. 4 If the Texas court hands
down a judgment without California as a party to the litigation, that judg-
ment will not necessarily be res judicata in any subsequent suits brought
in California courts. 5 Whenever a judgment of a state court is asserted to
be res judicata in another state court's proceeding, the adjudicative juris-
diction of the rendering court is subject to inquiry; if it appears that the
rendering court did not have adjudicative jurisdiction, its judgment is not
entitled to full faith and credit.3 6
In the area of estate taxation, only the state in which the decedent was
domiciled has adjudicative jurisdiction.3 7 Therefore, California may sim-
ply ignore the Texas judgment by declaring that the decedent was domi-
ciled in California, not Texas, and that the Texas court did not have ju-
risdiction to render a judgment. Texas may, of course, do the same if suit
is originally brought in a California state court. Only if one state is will-
ing to appear and be bound by the decision of the opposing state will the
resulting judgment protect the estate from double taxation. Not surpris-
ingly, states have often been unwilling to waive their sovereign immunity
in another state's court, particularly when the disputed estate taxes in-
volve a large sum of money.3
court's inability to assert jurisdiction over New York taxing authorities to prevent double escheat of
intangible property threatened due process violation). In reaching its holding, the Court declared: "It
is plain that Pennsylvania courts, with no power to bring other States before them, cannot give such
hearings." Id. at 80. See also Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). The Court
explained:
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article III,
or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits
against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates
which limit and control .... There is also the postulate that States of the Union, still pos-
sessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent ....
Id. at 322. After the decision in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), discussed infra note 34, states
may no longer possess such absolute immunity in other states' courts.
34. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (state sovereign immunity in other states' courts is
not grounded in or compelled by the Constitution, but rather is a matter of comity between states).
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Hall does suggest, though, that on the basis of a disclaimer in footnote
24 of the majority opinion, the holding should be limited to those circumstances where the state
official has crossed over state borders and entered into the territory of another sovereign state. Thus in
Hall, the Nevada state official lost his immunity because he had entered California territory. 440 U.S.
at 428-32 (Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Despite the majority's
broad holding in Hall, states probably will still feel compelled to grant other states sovereign immu-
nity in their state courts, if only as a matter of comity.
35. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 401-04 (1917) (in rem judgments as to domicile
rendered in one state court not binding on another state's court); Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43, 59
(1907) (state court not bound by another state's adjudication of domicile if jurisdiction was lacking);
Thormann v. Frame, 176 U.S. 350, 356 (1900) (court presented with claim of res judicata may
inquire into jurisdiction of rendering court).
36. Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U.S. 162 (1914).
37. Nevin v. Martin, 22 F. Supp. 836, 839 (D.N.J. 1938), af/'d, 307 U.S. 615 (1939).
38. When a state has waived its sovereign immunity and agreed to appear as a party in another
state's court, binding judgments of domicile have then been rendered. See, e.g., In re Bourne's Estate,
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B. The Inadequacies of Lower Federal Court Remedies
Federal courts do not have jurisdiction to resolve the multiple domicile
question either. There is neither federal question jurisdiction, since domi-
cile is a state law concept, nor diversity jurisdiction, since states cannot be
citizens of themselves for the purpose of diversity. 9 Additionally, the Elev-
enth Amendment bars suits against states in a federal court.4
The Federal Interpleader Act of 193641 was enacted in part to remedy
the adjudicative gap caused by the federal courts' limited jurisdiction. A
federal question is no longer needed to bring a suit in a federal court if
the adverse parties are diverse. Shortly after passage of the Act, in
Worcestor County v. Riley, 2 estate administrators sought to interplead the
state taxing officials of Massachusetts and California to determine where
the decedent had been domiciled. The Court found, however, that even
though a federal question was no longer needed to bring the suit in fed-
eral court, the suit was still one forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment.4"
The administrators had tried to bring their case within the scope of the Ex
parte Young doctrine,44 arguing that the levy of the same estate tax by two
states violated the due process clause. The suit, therefore, was not against
the state but against the state taxing officials to prevent an unconstitu-
tional extension of state power. The administrators argued that since the
parties in interest-the state officials-were citizens of states for diversity
purposes, the suit fell within the federal court's diversity jurisdiction.4"
181 Misc. 238, 41 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Sur. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 A.D. 876, 47 N.Y.S.2d 134 (App. Div.),
aff'd, 293 N.Y. 785, 58 N.E.2d 729 (1944); In re Benjamin's Estate, 176 Misc. 518, 27 N.Y.S.2d
948 (Sur. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 263 A.D. 981, 34 N.Y.S.2d 394 (App. Div.), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 554, 43
N.E.2d 531 (1942).
39. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894).
40. The Eleventh Amendment declares: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONSr.
amend. XI. Despite the amendment's literal language, the Court has construed the amendment to bar
suits brought by citizens against their own states as well as against other states, and to bar even suits
arising under the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 15
(1890).
41. Pub. L. No. 422, 49 Stat. 1096 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982)). Congress
passed the new Act to provide a federal forum for disputes where state courts lacking adjudicative
jurisdiction over out-of-state parties consequently lacked the power to provide a remedy. The act
permits a stakeholder holding an asset or assets claimed by two or more persons from differing states
to join all the claimants in one suit. For a description of how the interpleader action might work, see
Note, Double Domicile, supra note 25, at 1246 n.40 (1980).
42. 302 U.S. 292 (1937).
43. Id. at 299-300.
44. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (state officer's attempt to enforce unconstitutional
statute constitutes proceeding without authority of state in its sovereign or governmental capacity,
strips officer's actions of their official character, and subjects officer to consequences of his or her
individual conduct).
45. There is some question as to whether Ex parte Young would distinguish the state officer from
the state for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Some federal district courts have held that Ex parte
Young does render the suit one against the state officer for diversity purposes. See Mouton v. Sinclair
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Surprisingly, despite its relatively recent holding that only one state, the
state of domicile, could levy an estate tax,46 the Court refused to declare
the double taxation unconstitutional. Instead, the Court held that because
the Constitution does not require identical findings on issues of fact in the
decisions of different state courts, each state's adjudication of domicile was
valid. There had been no due process violation to render the suit one
against the state officials for diversity purposes, or remove the Eleventh
Amendment bar.4
The Eleventh Amendment has remained a fatal stumbling block. In the
1978 Howard .Hughes case, the Supreme Court suggested that Edelman
v. Jordan48 had overruled Worcestor County's holding that the Eleventh
Amendment bars a stakeholder from interpleading two states in a federal
district court.49 Four years later, however, the Supreme Court rejected its
Oil & Gas Co., 410 F.2d 717, 718 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 957 (1970); Ohio ex rel.
Seney v. Swift & Co., 270 F. 141, 150 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 633 (1921), appeal dis-
missed, 260 U.S. 146 (1922); State Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 6 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (W.D. Tex. 1934).
Other federal courts have ruled to the contrary. See Nuclear Eng'g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 251
(7th Cir. 1981); Eure v. N.V.F. Co., 481 F. Supp. 639, 641 (E.D.N.C. 1979); National Mkt. Re-
ports, Inc. v. Brown, 443 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 n.7 (S.D.W. Va. 1978). The Supreme Court has not
ruled on the question.
46. First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
47. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299-300 (1937).
48. 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (Ex parte Young allows only prospective declaratory or injunctive relief,
not retroactive payments from state treasuries, as remedy in suit brought against state officers for
unconstitutional processing of welfare applications).
49. Four Justices espoused this view when concurring in California v. Texas I, 437 U.S. 601
(1978) (denying California's first motion for leave to file complaint under Court's original jurisdiction
to resolve question of where Howard Hughes was domiciled at time of his death). The administrators
of the Hughes estate subsequently filed an interpleader action in a federal district court in Texas. The
district court judge dismissed without discussion the concurring Justices' view of Edelman, and in-
stead relied on the holding in Worcestor County that no constitutional violation was involved. Lummis
v. White, 491 F. Supp. 5, 9 (W.D. Tex. 1979). Reasoning that therefore the real parties at interest
were the states, and that states cannot be citizens of themselves for the purposes of diversity, the judge
dismissed the interpleader action as lacking diversity. Id. at 8. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed.
After discussing the extensive history of the Interpleader Act and the congressional intent that it be a
flexible tool of equity, Lummis v. White, 629 F.2d 397, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1980), the court attempted
to explain how Edelman v. Jordan had overruled, sub silentio, Worcester County. The court of
appeals reasoned that the remedy sought was not one which would have imposed a liability to be paid
from public funds in the state treasury. Rather, it was a remedy which would have had "fiscal conse-
quences to state treasuries . . . [only as] the necessary result of compliance with decrees which by
their terms [are] prospective in nature." Id. at 401 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 667-68).
The administrators were not, the court reasoned, suing for funds from the state treasury, but rather
were seeking to prevent a future collection of money. And even then, the administrators sought not so
much to prevent the collection of money as to obtain a single determination of domicile. Thus, the
effect on the state treasury could be seen as ancillary to the remedy sought. Under this interpretation,
the suit would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 402. Since the states were still the
real parties in interest, however, the court of appeals was still forced to engage in some fairly elabo-
rate and unorthodox jurisdictional gymnastics to find that the parties did satisfy the diversity require-
ments necessary to file an interpleader action in a federal court. The court found diversity by assum-
ing that an interested stakeholder may be considered for purposes of establishing diversity under 28
U.S.C. § 1335. Id. at 403. Since it had already been conceded that the acting county treasurer of Los
Angeles County was a citizen of California for diversity purposes, id. at 402, there was diversity
between two adverse parties-the interested Nevada stakeholder and the California treasurer. Id. at
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own suggestion, instead holding that Edelman had not so narrowed the
scope of the Eleventh Amendment.5" The Court emphasized that the Elev-
enth Amendment gives way only when state officers "are alleged to be
acting contrary to federal law or against the authority of state law."
51
Since neither violation had been alleged, Worcestor County v. Riley was
still a valid and controlling precedent.52
C. The Supreme Court Remedy-Available Only at the Court's
Discretion
The only potential remedy for the dilemma caused by the multiple tax-
ation of intangibles is for one state to sue the other state under the United
States Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.53 Yet this remedy is tenuous.
There must be a controversy between the states. As long as all the claim-
ing states may collect the taxes levied, however, there is no dispute be-
tween the states.54
Only in the rare instance that there is not enough money in the estate
to pay all the claimed taxes will the claiming states have a monetary in-
terest in the litigation and become real parties in interest. The Supreme
Court will then have jurisdiction over the controversy, but that jurisdiction
is discretionary. The Supreme Court may refuse to hear the dispute.55
404.
50. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982).
51. Id. at 90-91.
52. Id. at 91.
53. The landmark case which set the precedent for such suits under the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939). Agreeing to adjudicate the dispute over the
decedent's domicile in the nature of interpleader, the Court declared that even though the state courts
had not yet reduced the estate's liability to a final judgment and even though the estate funds had not
yet actually been exhausted, there was still a justiciable "case or controversy." The Court appointed a
Special Master to determine the decedent's domicile at the time of death.
54. Until the estate has been exhausted only the administrators and beneficiaries of the estate have
an interest at stake. See California v. Texas I, 437 U.S. 601, 610 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring);
Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1939).
Today the chances of an estate actually being exhausted are especially slim. An increasing number
of states, including California, levy only a "pick-up tax," that takes advantage of the credit for state
estate taxes provided by I.R.C. § 2011 (1984). All State Compendiums, INHER. EST. & GiFr TAx
REP. (CCH) 70,101-70,633. Assuming a top federal rate of 55%, the § 2011 credit permits a state to
"pick-up" a tax worth 16% of the taxable estate. In effect, the federal government levies only a 39%
tax, while the state levies a 16% tax. Once this credit is exhausted, additional state taxes raise the
effective tax rate above 55%. But as long as each state tax does not exceed 16% (most state taxes do
not), an additional 3 states still would have to levy taxes before the estate was exhausted.
55. See California v. Texas II, 457 U.S. 164, 168 (1982). The Supreme Court looks to two factors
when it decides whether or not to hear a case under its original jurisdiction:
A determination that this Court has original jurisdiction over a case, of course, does not re-
quire us to exercise that jurisdiction. We have imposed prudential and equitable limitations
upon the exercise of our original jurisdiction. ...
"And the question of what is appropriate [to determine jurisdiction] concerns, of course,
the seriousness and the dignity of the claim; yet beyond that it necessarily involves the
availability of another forum where there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where
the issues tendered may be litigated, and where appropriate relief may be had."
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The requirement of ripeness poses an additional obstacle: Until all the
claiming states have rendered final judgments that the decedent was domi-
ciled within each of their respective borders at the time of death, assessed
the taxes owed, and found the assets of the estate inadequate to pay the
taxes, the claim may be too speculative to be heard by the Supreme
Court. 6
In summary, both state and lower federal courts lack the power to pro-
vide adequate remedies for the problem of multiple taxation on the basis
of domicile. State courts have no power to assert jurisdiction over other
states or to render judgments enforceable in other state courts. The Elev-
enth Amendment expressly prohibits federal courts from hearing suits
brought against sovereign states. Even the remedy which the Supreme
Court may provide is inadequate-only rarely do the preconditions neces-
sary to seek adjudication under the Court's original jurisdiction occur.
One must look elsewhere to address the multiple taxation problem caused
by multiple findings of domicile.
III. MOVING TOWARD A NEW DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Despite its uneasiness with multiple taxation of intangible estates, the
Aldrich Court feared to do "violence to the words 'due process' by draw-
ing lines where the Fourteenth Amendment fails to draw them.""5 The
Aldrich Court realized that the attempt to impose due process limits on
intangible estates by analogy to real and tangible estates was not only
anachronistic and unworkable, but also insensitive to basic federalism con-
cerns. As one dissenting Justice noted, although due process requires that
states possess a nexus that justifies the exercise of taxation powers, due
process does not define what that nexus should be.58 Only twice has the
taxing nexus been so obvious that the Court has declared that only that
one nexus and no other nexus could be a permissible one: Only the state
that physically protects real estate renders a taxable benefit. Other bene-
fits a state might confer upon real estate are deemed insubstantial, if not
illusory. 59 The same applies to tangible property.6"
457 U.S. at 168 (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1972) (citations
omitted)).
56. See California v. Texas II, 457 U.S. at 170 (Powell, J., joined by Marshall, Rehnquist, &
Stevens, JJ., dissenting) ("The mere possibility of inconsistent state determinations of domicile, result-
ing in a still more remote possibility of the estate's being insufficient to satisfy the competing claims,
simply does not give rise to a case or controversy in the constitutional sense."); see also California v.
Texas 1, 437 U.S. 601, 611, 614-15 (1978) (Stewart, J., joined by Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring)
(same). Under this reasoning, the precedent-setting case of Texas v. Florida, discussed supra note 53,
should not have been heard by the Supreme Court in the first place.
57. State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 179 (1942).
58. Id. at 201 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
59. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1939).
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The taxation of real estate and chattels, however, is an exception to the
norm of allowing the states to specify the taxable benefit. 61 As other areas
of law indicate, the due process clause does not mandate specific contacts.
It requires only that there be a rational connection between the state and
the activity governed that justifies the exercise of state sovereign power.62
Nonetheless, even though the Court has found that due process does not
require one particular nexus in the taxation of intangible estates as it does
in the taxation of real and tangible estates," there are due process limits
on taxation which the Court has failed to acknowledge in its most recent
estate taxation cases.6 The Court has not followed its own lead: In the
choice of law and adjudicative jurisdiction areas, the Court has brought
about an almost complete restructuring of due process analysis. The move
has been one away from the old doctrines that had effectively determined
state law to analyses that look to whether the assertion of state power is
justified by certain minimum contacts or connections. 65 Moreover, under-
lying much of the evolving due process doctrine is a more focused sensitiv-
60. Id.
61. Bittker, supra note 4, argues persuasively that the Constitution should not specify the benefit
conferred for tangible property either. Comparing tangibles to intangibles, Bittker finds that those
benefits conferred by states upon tangibles cannot any more easily be allocated to one state than can
benefits conferred upon intangibles. Moreover, while the rule of situs for real property may be too
deeply rooted in common law simply to overrule, and the rationale given in Curry v. McCanless, 307
U.S. 357 (1939), that only the state of situs can render a meaningful benefit, really does hold, the
same is not true for tangibles. As with intangibles, the due process clause should not be read to
preclude taxation of tangible property by more than one state.
62. The due process clause requires "minimal contacts" before a state court can assert personal
jurisdiction over a defendant. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (citing International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). Likewise, due process requires significant contacts or
aggregation of interests before a state court may apply forum law. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 308 (1981). Due process imposes a parallel restraint on state taxation by requiring that a
taxing state possess a nexus that justifies the tax it levies. Justice Powell quotes an oft-repeated
definition of the limits that due process places on state taxing powers:
"Th[e] test is whether property was taken without due process of law, or, if paraphrase we
must, whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, oppor-
tunities and benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling question is whether the
state has given anything for which it can ask return."
Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 98 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Wisconsin
v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24 & notes 3, 4, 5, 7 & 18.
64. See, e.g., California v. Texas II, 457 U.S. 164, 165 (1982) (California's motion seeking
Court's original jurisdiction granted); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982) (double taxation of
intangible estates on the basis of domicile does not violate the Constitution).
65. For literature discussing the evolution of due process limits in the choice of law area, see
Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
94 (1976); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185 (1976);
Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUm. L. REv. 1587 (1978). For articles discussing adjudicative
jurisdiction, see Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdic-
tion, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77; Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT.
REV. 241; Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction
of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHS. L. REv. 569 (1958).
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ity towards state sovereignty and towards the powers states need to remain
viable governing units within a federal structure."e
This concern shows itself clearly in the corporate income tax area. The
Supreme Court has been a somewhat unwilling and definitely cautious
final arbiter in disputes concerning state corporate taxation. 7 The Court
protests that the only body which should so intrude upon state powers is
Congress. 8 Despite these repeated declarations, Congress has been decid-
edly chary of exercising its legislative powers.69 The Tax Injunction Act70
similarly embodies the deference that has traditionally been accorded to
state taxing powers. The Act severely restricts federal court jurisdiction
over claims concerning state taxes and "has its roots in equity practice, in
66. See Hazard, supra note 65 at 245-248; Kurland, supra note 65 at 569; see also Kirgis, supra
note 65 (arguing that Full Faith and Credit clause better suited to address such state sovereignty and
federalism concerns).
67. The Court most recently declared that it will "if reasonably possible, defer to the judgment of
state courts in deciding whether a particular set of activities constitutes a 'unitary business."'
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2945 (1983). See also 1 J. HELLER-
STEIN, STATE TAXATION: CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES 338-89 (historical and ana-
lytical account of Supreme Court's reluctance to strike down state corporate income tax laws).
68. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, where the Court stated:
[T]he freedom of the States to formulate independent policy in this area may have to yield to
an overriding national interest in uniformity .. . . It is clear that the legislative power
granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply justify the
enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the division of
income. It is to that body, and not this Court, that the Constitution has committed such policy
decisions.
437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978).
69. Despite its powers under the commerce clause, Congress had not, prior to 1959, legislated in
the state corporate income tax area. Since then it has enacted six pieces of legislation-all quite
narrow in scope. See Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations: Reflec-
tions on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REv. 113, 113-15 (1980). Instead, the states
have largely been left to regulate themselves. Many states have adopted uniform statutes or adopted
the MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT (1967). Because estate taxes do not fall within the scope of the
commerce clause, it is also at least questionable whether the Constitution has authorized Congress to
legislate in the state estate tax area, as two commentators have suggested that it should. See Comment,
How Far Will Multi-State Death Taxation Go?, 1 VAND. L. REV. 93, 105 n.46 (1947); Note, Deter-
mination of Domicil for Inheritance Tax Purposes by an Original Action in the United States Su-
preme Court, 46 Yale L.J. 1235, 1242 (1937). Although the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment authorizes Congress to enforce the commands of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ment, it is not clear that the grant of power would extend to those concerns not having to do with civil
rights. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-14, 5-20 (1978). Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has engaged in fierce debate as to the scope of Congressional power vis-i-vis the states.
See E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1060 (1983) (sovereign immunity as functional doctrine
to ensure states' independent existence within federal structure). Contra, Garcia v. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Auth., 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (overruling National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). There is little, if any, literature exploring the interesting
question of whether Congress could legislate in this area, i.e. enact a uniform definition of domicile as
a matter of federal law.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). The Act provides that "[tihe district courts shall not enjoin, suspend
or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." Id.
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principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a
State to administer its own fiscal operations." 1
The original attempts to use the due process clause to prevent the mul-
tiple taxation of estates did not take a balanced approach towards the
sovereign rights of both the state and federal governments. Rather, by re-
quiring a specific nexus, the Court effectively dictated state law. Yet in
overruling the constitutional requirement of domicile, the Aldrich Court
went too far to accommodate state powers. States' rights need not be un-
limited. The due process analysis which has developed in the corporate
tax area suggests an alternative, more balanced approach.
IV. DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON STATE CORPORATE INCOME
TAXATION SHOULD BE APPLIED TO STATE ESTATE TAXATION
In the corporate tax area, due process requires first that the levying
state confer a benefit that justifies the tax levied, and second that the tax
be rationally related to taxing values within the state. The latter require-
ment reflects an implicit bar against double taxation.
A. Due Process Does Not Permit the Abuse of a Nexus
Just as the Supreme Court has refused to mandate the basis on which a
state may levy an estate tax on intangibles,"2 the Supreme Court has re-
fused to mandate the basis on which a state may levy a corporate income
71. Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 73 (1976). In Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'! Bank, 450 U.S.
503 (1981), the Court explained:
Finally, we note that the reasons supporting federal non-interference are just as compelling
today as they were in in 1937. If federal injunctive relief were available,
"state tax administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape
the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law. During the pendency of
the federal suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed,
with consequent damage to the State's budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the
risk of taxpayer insolvency."
Id. at 527 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 128 n.17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)). Of the recent cases construing the scope of the Tax Injunction Act, Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), announces most strongly the
federalism and state sovereignty arguments barring federal court intervention in the state tax area.
Indeed, the opinion looks beyond the Tax Injunction Act to general federalism and comity restraints:
"The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all
times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their
fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted
federal right may be preserved without it."
Id. at 111 (quoting Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 298 (1943), which
quoted Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932)). Admittedly, the Tax Injunction Act and
even Fair Assessment speak only to the restraint which should be exercised by the lower federal
courts, and not to the restraints that should be exercised by the Supreme Court, or by Congress.
Nonetheless, the Act indicates that, if it is at all possible, restraint should be exercised. See also supra
notes 67-69 (describing restraints on Supreme Court and Congress).
72. State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 181-82 (1942).
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tax. 3 A state may levy a corporate income tax on the basis of corporate
privilege or unitary business or any other nexus it shows as qualifying
under due process standards. 74 Those states which use a separate account-
ing method 5 to measure the income which a corporation generates within
its borders levy a tax only if the corporation conducts a business within
the state and avails itself of corporate privilege.76 Other states use the uni-
tary business tax method,77 levying a tax only if the corporation conducts
a unitary business within the state.78 Because the various taxes are all
based on a minimal connection or nexus between the taxing state and the
activities taxed, all are constitutional methods.7  Due process does not, ex-
cept as regards situs of real property or tangible personalty, declare that
one method is the constitutionally mandated one."0
73. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). Justice Frankfurter
declared:
The Constitution is not a formulary. It does not demand of states strict observance of rigid
categories nor precision of technical phrasing in their exercise of the most basic power of
government, that of taxation .... A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembar-
rassed by the Constitution, if by practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its powers in
relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits
which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.
Id. at 444. See also Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2941 (1983)
(there must be both minimal connection or nexus between business activities and taxing state, and
rational relationship between income attributed to state and intrastate value of enterprise); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980) (same); Exxon Corp. v. Department
of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1980) (same).
74. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978); see supra note 73.
75. There are two types of corporate income taxes: (1) excise taxes on doing business or owning
property within the state and (2) taxes on net income derived from or attributable to business within
the state. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 67, at 263-64. The latter type of tax, the corporate income
tax, is levied by states in two different ways. If a business is entirely intra-state or the income flowing
in from a business is clearly allocable to business within the state, the state taxing authorities will
usually use a separate accounting basis to tax corporate income. "Separate accounting is a technique
of carving out of the overall business of the taxpayer the activities taking place, the property employed
in, and the income derived from, sources within a single State .... " Id. at 323.
76. Id.
77. As businesses have increasingly become nationwide enterprises, it has become more difficult to
break down corporate earnings state by state with any accuracy. Id. at 300. Most state taxing authori-
ties now use what is called a unitary business tax method to tax corporate income. Many states have
adopted the UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES Acr, 7A U.L.A. 91 (1978)
("UDITPA"). J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 67, at 333-35. Defining unitary business, the Supreme
Court stated:
The "unitary business" technique involves calculating a corporate taxpayer's net income on the
basis of all phases of a single enterprise (e.g., production of components, assembly, packing,
distribution, sales), even if located outside the jurisdiction. The portion of that income attribu-
table to activities within the taxing State is then determined by means of an apportionment
formula.
United States Steel Corp. v. MultiState Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 n. 25 (1978). The typical
state apportions the percentage which it is entitled to tax on the basis of three factors: (1) property
within the state as a percentage of total property owned; (2) payroll within the state as a percentage
of total payroll; and (3) sales within the state as a percentage of total sales. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 67, at 330-38.
78. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980).
79. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 57-62 and 72-80.
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Even though the due process clause does not mandate the use of a par-
ticular nexus, neither does it permit the abuse of a nexus. The nexus
ensures that there is some minimal connection between the business activ-
ity taxed and the state.8' The state cannot arbitrarily define the nexus and
thereby rob the nexus of its constitutional function. A state may not, for
example, declare that it is using the unitary business principle to deter-
mine what parts of the corporate income shall form the base to be appor-
tioned, and then include all of a corporation's income, including non-
unitary income, as part of the unitary business income.82
A similar analysis fits easily within the estate taxation context, and
would provide both coherence and fairness. Due process does not mandate
that a state levy an estate tax only on the basis of domicile, but once a
state has declared that its nexus is domicile, it may not then simply define
domicile in such a way as to enable itself to tax estates regardless of actual
domicile-regardless of the professed nexus. Due process should not per-
mit states to overreach by claiming domicile when the decedent was not
domiciled within the state at the time of death.
Adopting this approach would not require the Supreme Court to set
forth its own definition of domicile. In the area of corporate taxation, the
Court has not set forth its own definition of what constitutes a unitary
business. 83 Rather, when a corporation has made a colorable claim that
the state's definition of a unitary business effectively renders the concept a
nullity, the Court conducts a case-by-case review.84 Even though the
Court has refused to advance a federal definition of what constitutes a
unitary business, it is clear that there are constitutional components that
form a federal floor on which the definition must rest. The state's defini-
tion of what constitutes a unitary business must contain at least those
components that make the unitary business principle an acceptable nexus
81. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1968)
("[Tlhe Court has insisted for many years that a State is not entitled to tax tangible or intangible
property that is unconnected with the State . . . . [blecause it denies to the taxpayer the process that
is his due.") (citations omitted) (citing Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1904)); J. HELLER-
STEIN, supra note 67, at 412-34.
82. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear cases where a corporation has alleged that a state was
including non-unitary income within its unitary business income. See ASARCO v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (Idaho could not constitutionally include income having no connection
with Idaho as part of apportionable unitary business income); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation &
Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982) (unrelated business income not part of apportionable unitary
business income); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980) (intercorporate
dividend income part of apportionable unitary business income); Exxon Corp. v. Department of Reve-
nue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980) (because marketing operations part of larger unitary business, income at-
tributable to marketing operations part of apportionable unitary business income).
83. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2941 (1983); Moorman
Mfg., 437 U.S. at 279-80.
84. See Container Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2945-46.
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under the due process clause."5 The federal question which the Court ad-
dresses in its unitary business cases is whether the state is overreaching
through its definition of the nexus, thus rendering the nexus a nullity, and
the taxes levied a violation of due process."'
A parallel federal question as to whether a state has overreached in its
definition of domicile would give the Supreme Court jurisdiction in its
appellate role.8 7 To resolve the question, the estate administrators would
bring their suits in the relevant state courts, and then request Supreme
Court review if those state courts denied the relief sought. The adminis-
trators would have a right of appeal to the Supreme Court if they charged
that a state's definition of domicile on its face violates due process. If the
estate administrators charged that the application of the state's definition
of domicile violates due process, then they would have to petition for a
writ of certiorari.8 8 In either case, the administrators would have a remedy
at law-one which does not depend on the rare double contingency that
the taxes are actually levied and that there is not enough money to pay
them.
As an example, the administators of the Howard Hughes estate have a
colorable claim that the state of Texas overreached constitutional limits
through its definition of domicile. To support their motions for and
against leave to file a complaint under the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction, both California 9 and Texas"0 set forth facts supporting the argu-
ment that Hughes had abandoned his domicile in Texas sometime during
85. See Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 363-64.
86. The Court has held that defining a unitary business as constituting all the income that "adds
to the riches of the corporation" trivializes the due process limits on state taxing powers. Woolworth,
458 U.S. at 363 (quoting Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 70 (1920)). In another case, the Court
declared that defining unitary business by corporate purpose rather than underlying economic reality
"would destroy the concept." ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 326.
1 87. Contrary to Justice Powell's suggestion in Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 101 (1982) (Powell,
J., joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting), seeking adjudication in a federal district court
would be highly problematic. Even though there are federal questions at stake, the Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), denies the federal district courts jurisdiction to restrain a state tax in all
but the exceptional case when there is no other remedy available. The Tax Injunction Act has kept all
of the corporate income tax cases out of federal district courts and would probably do the same for
estate taxation cases. Ironically, when there is no federal question, the Tax Injunction Act would not
bar an interpleader action in a federal district court since no other remedy is available. The Eleventh
Amendment, however, bars such a suit. One can circumvent the Eleventh Amendment only by alleg-
ing a constitutional violation, but once one has alleged a constitutional violation there is a federal
question giving rise to Supreme Court review. Once Supreme Court review is available, the Tax
Injunction Act applies, and bars an interpleader action.
88. Supreme Court review would also enable estate administrators to raise another, perhaps more
classic, due process violation. Where the state has found domicile without the authority of state law
and inconsistently with past state precedent, the Court may strike down that finding of domicile and
declare that it will not allow the adequate state grounds doctrine to nullify due process limits. See
discussion supra note 29.
89. Motion for Leave to File Complaint and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to
File Complaint, California v. Texas I, 437 U.S. 601 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Memorandum
in Support].
90. On Motion For Leave to File Complaint: Brief in Opposition, California v. Texas I, 437 U.S.
1246
Estate Taxation
his twenties. The California brief states that after Howard Hughes moved
to California at the age of twenty, he did not return to Texas. Though he
made self-serving statements that he did intend to return to Texas, he had
arguably abandoned his Texas domicile and acquired a new domicile in
California."1 The administrators could charge that the Texas state law on
its face, or in its application, trivializes due process limits. By defining
domicile in a way that enables it to claim that any person who is born
within its borders, regardless of subsequent actions, remains a domiciliary
of Texas, Texas law renders the concept and constitutional function of
domicile a nullity. Presented with such an argument, the Supreme Court
could decide that Texas had overreached itself in defining the nexus, and
declare that only California may levy an estate tax on the Howard
Hughes estate.
Due process limits on overreaching will not, however, resolve all the
problems of multiple taxation. These limits will not address the situation
where the two disputing states each have definitions of domicile that meet
the federal floor, and have applied the definitions consistently. Nor will
such limits resolve a dispute in which the determination of domicile is
genuinely difficult, or one in which one of the states has made a mistaken
finding of fact. The words spoken by the Court in Worcestor County v.
Riley will still hold true: "[T]he Constitution of the United States does not
guarantee that the decisions of state courts shall be free from error."
'92
601 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Brief in Opposition].
91. The Memorandum in Support for California states that Howard Hughes was born in Texas
in 1905 and lived there for 20 years. He then moved to California and lived at the Beverly Hills
Hotel in Los Angeles for the following 40 years until 1966. After leaving Texas in 1926, Hughes
returned only for brief, occasional visits, but made apparently self-serving statements that he was still
domiciled in Texas and claimed a mailing address there. While in California he developed "substan-
tial new business interests and investments, including film production, aviation and aircraft manufac-
ture." Memorandum in Support, supra note 89, at 7-8. The Brief in Opposition for Texas concedes
that beginning in 1929 Hughes spent the majority of his time in California until 1966. During this
period, he paid California taxes at the resident rate even though he claimed nonresidency on his
California income tax returns. The Texas brief does not say that he paid any income taxes to Texas
during this time, or afterwards. Hughes paid only a Texas poll tax until 1952. Brief in Opposition,
supra note 90, at 2-5. At least on the basis of these facts, it seems quite clear that Howard Hughes
gave up his domicile of origin for a new domicile of choice-California. Even though Hughes never
bought a home in California and never developed the normal intimacies that one associates with
making a place one's home, he did leave Texas. If he intended to return to Texas for any length of
time, he never did so during his lifetime. Nor did he pay income taxes to Texas after 1926. On the
contrary, Hughes lived in California for 40 years, and while he traveled frequently, until 1966 he
always returned to the Beverly Hills Hotel. The state of California taxed Hughes as a domiciliary,
and though he did go through the formality of filing a nonresident return, he never protested. It has
been oft-repeated "that 'a man's home is where he makes it, not where he would like to have it.' It
might also be said that 'a man's domicile is where the law fixes it, not where he tries to put it."'
Tweed & Sargent, Death and Taxes Are Certain-But What of Domicile, 53 HARV. L. REV. 68, 84
(1939).
92. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299 (1937) (citations omitted).
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B. Apportionment-The Implicit Bar Against Double Taxation
Beyond the requirement that there be a nexus, due process mandates
that "the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be ration-
ally related to 'values connected with the taxing state."" States sometimes
use a separate accounting method to measure the income a corporation
generates within its borders. Separate accounting fulfills the due process
rational relationship requirement by taxing only the income generated
within the state."4 States also use the unitary business tax method. Because
the unitary business principle allows several states to levy a tax on the
same income, states use an apportionment formula to ensure that the tax
is rationally related to income generated within the state.
95
The Court, however, has repeatedly refused to inject itself into the de-
bate as to which apportionment formulas are the most accurate and most
fair ways to tax corporate income.9 6 As long as the formula of apportion-
ment which the state chooses is "rationally related" to the values being
taxed, states may use any formula they wish. Thus the Court has ap-
proved the use of a world-wide unitary business formula with three fac-
tors for apportionment, 97 a one factor formula to apportion income earned
only within the United States,98 and also a three factor formula apportion-
ing United States income.99 There may be some overlap between the taxes
which results in the slight overtaxation of a corporation which does busi-
ness in several states, but such inaccuracies are considered an inevitable
result of the uncertainties of measuring such a tax, and not worthy of
judicial intervention.'" 0
93. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978) (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v.
Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968)).
94. See supra note 75.
95. See United States Steel Corp. v. MultiState Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1977), where the
Court explained: "Taxable income deemed apportionable is that which is not considered to have its
source totally within one State. It is distributed by means of an apportionment formula among the
States in which the multistate business operates." Id. at 474 n.27.
96. Moorman Mfg., 437 U.S. at 278-80.
97. See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2956-57 (1983)
(upholding California statute apportioning income derived from world-wide unitary business rather
than from United States unitary business).
98. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg., 437 U.S. at 281 (upholding Iowa's use of one factor apportionment
formula).
99. See, e.g., Container Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2943 (declaring three factor apportionment formula a
benchmark against which all other formulas measured).
100. In one case, the Court declared:
[The unitary business method,] unlike separate accounting, does not purport to identify the
precise geographical source of a corporation's profits; rather it is employed as a rough approxi-
mation of a corporation's income that is reasonably related to the activities conducted within
the taxing State . . . . Both [the one factor and the three factor formula] will occasionally
over-reflect or under-reflect income attributable to the taxing State. Yet despite this impreci-
sion, the Court has refused to impose strict constitutional restraints on a State's selection of a
particular formula.
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
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Yet due process is not infinitely elastic. Once the state has properly
defined the nexus, the formula that the state uses to levy on the basis of
that nexus must be both fair and rationally related to taxing values within
the state.' 0 ' In evaluating one state's corporate taxation statutes, the Court
declared: "The first, and again obvious, component of fairness in an ap-
portionment formula is what might be called internal consistency-that is
the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would
result in no more than all of the unitary business's income being
taxed."' 2 A state's corporate income tax formula may not result in an
inevitable overtaxation. For instance, a formula whereby a state appor-
tions all of the corporation's sales revenue, wherever earned, to itself, vio-
lates due process.103 If the formula were applied by every jurisdiction, and
the corporation did business in five states, the other four states would also
apportion all of the sales revenue to themselves, and the corporation
would be taxed on 500% of its unitary business's sales revenue. Extreme
overtaxation, akin to double taxation, violates the due process requirement
of fairness.
Stemming from the same concern that the tax be rationally related to
income earned within a state, the Court then declared: "The second and
more difficult requirement is what might be called external consis-
tency-the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actu-
ally reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated."' 4 A taxpayer
challenging a state's corporate income tax formula bears the burden of
proving "by clear and cogent evidence"' 0 5 that the apportionment formula
attributes to the state an amount of income that is 'out of all appropriate
proportion to the business transacted ... in that State."'0 6 Should the
taxpayer bear that burden, the Supreme Court will strike down the ap-
portionment formula. In one early unitary business tax case, the Court
struck down a formula because it attributed more than twice the income
shown as being generated in the state, to that one state.10 7
Fairness under the due process clause prohibits gross overtaxation both
by one state alone-one state alone may not double its tax by doubling the
income attributable to itself-and by several states jointly. Thus, while
due process does not bar double taxation on the basis of differing benefits
101. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968); Hans
Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1931).




105. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942) (citing Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. North
Carolina, 297 U.S. 682, 688 (1936)).
106. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931).
107. Id.
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conferred to a single estate, it does bar double taxation or extreme
overtaxation on the basis of the same benefit conferred.
Transplanted to the context of estate taxation, this standard of fairness
forbids the gross overtaxation of an estate, whether by one state alone or
by several states jointly. In the Howard Hughes case, each state's formula
attributed 100% of the estate to each state, resulting in an inevitable taxa-
tion of 200% of the estate rather than just 100%.
Admittedly, corporations have been hard pressed to show such dramatic
overtaxation when they have challenged the state apportionment formu-
las.' 08 Such gross overtaxation, however, usually arises from the failure to
split taxes, rather than from grossly distorted factor weighting. When
states levy estate taxes the assumption is that since only one state will levy
the tax there is no need to apportion the income. The same assumption
underlies the separate accounting-method for the corporate income tax.
The state levies a tax only on income generated within the state. 109 When,
however, more than one state levies a tax on the same income, as is the
case with the unitary business tax, the state must then avoid overtaxation
by apportioning the income." 0
Hence, whenever more than one state has found that the decedent was
domiciled within its borders, and each state has done so within the con-
fines of its state laws and within the confines of the due process analysis,
the Supreme Court should intervene to remedy this extraordinary situa-
tion. Due process demands that a tax be rationally related to the values
being taxed, and double taxation of an intangible estate both violates the
rational relation and fairness required by due process. The Court has sev-
eral options: It could apportion the tax itself; or it could induce the states
to split the taxes owed, as it did in the recent California v. Texas dis-
pute."' The Court could also make a single and binding determination of
108. Container Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2949-50.
109. See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 67, at 323-27.
110. See supra note 95.
111. The Court could also set forth an apportionment formula. There are two basic problems,
however, with such an approach. The first is that such a formula might in effect dictate to states what
factors should be used to determine domicile and how those factors should be weighed. The Court
may prefer to refrain from such interference with state law. Second, it is not clear what sort of
apportionment formula the Court could set forth. One possibility would be to allocate intangible prop-
erty according to the tangible or real property located within the claiming states. But such an alloca-
tion seems both nonsensical and arbitrary. The amount of land that the deceased may have owned
within a state bears no relationship to the benefits conferred upon the succession of intangible prop-
erty. Another possibility would be to allocate according to the degree of connection the deceased had
with the claiming states. The Court could look to factors such as length of residence, taxes paid,
driver's license, voting records, local community activities, and other indicators of domiciliary intent.
Yet such an inquiry involves such extensive fact-finding that the Court would actually make its deci-
sions on an ad hoc basis, rather than on the basis of a formulary apportionment. For an article that
discusses possible ways of sharing the tax, see Farage, Multiple Domicils and Multiple Inheritance
Taxes-A Possible Solution, 9 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 375 (1941).
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domicile, allowing only one state to levy the tax. If the claiming states
have made legitimate findings of domicile under both their own state laws
and under the due process federal floor, however, it would be fairest to
encourage a settlement between the states, as was done in the Howard
Hughes case.
CONCLUSION
The history of property and estate taxation is "hardly one of settled
consistency. '11 2 Rather, it is a history that has created a constitutional due
process analysis which is both distorted by anachronisms and at times
grossly unfair. The Court should overrule Worcestor County v. Riley and
recognize that the established due process limits on state power in the
-corporate income tax area are equally applicable in the area of estate tax-
ation. The states would retain their sovereign taxing powers and still have
the discretion to choose how to levy their taxes. Their taxing machinery
would remain undisturbed. Only in the case of extreme distortion of
nexus, or in the extraordinary case where the determination of a dece-
dent's domicile is truly difficult, need there be any Supreme Court inter-
vention. The remedy will no longer depend on a double contingency giv-
ing rise to a dispute under the Court's original jurisdiction.
-Kathleen Leslie Roin
112. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 97 n.6 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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